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THE ECONOMICS OF WATER TRANSFER*
MICHAEL F. BREWERt
Rational development of water resources presupposes desirable
consequences on real income, whether it be at the level of an in-
dividual, some local region, or the nation at large. While the parties
affected will be concerned with those income effects which are inci-
dent upon them, policy decision for water development will invoke
income criteria that correspond to the jurisdictional scope of the
agency primarily responsible for development. The income conse-
quences will be determined in part by the devices employed for
project financing, repayment, and water transfer. The present dis-
cussion is concerned with the way in which water transfer arrange-
ments affect the economic growth resulting from water resources
development.
I
THE ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WATER TRANSFER
A continuum may be envisaged through which water resources
are developed, allocated to users, and finally committed to use.
Development activities increase the quantity of water available for
use over a given period within a service area, 1 which in turn is al-
located to users through the transfer process. Transfer thus refers
to ways in which users obtain water.
The process itself has three aspects, each of which is important
for economic growth: (1) the legal, (2) the financial, and (3) the
physical. The legal aspect includes the variety of ownership equities
and forms of contract that are used to facilitate water exchange
transactions. The financial aspect refers to the price or contractual
payment arrangements that may be involved, while the physical
aspect of water transfer includes the facilities and structures that
permit the transfer to occur.
The terms "water development" and "water use" have been used
in a way parallel, if not synonymous, with "production" and "con-
* Giannini Foundation Paper No. 257. Research on which this paper is based was
supported in part by the University of California Water Resources Center.
t Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Assistant Agricultural Econo-
mist in the Experiment Station and on the Giannini Foundation. The University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley.
1. This will involve a time-weighted quantity aggregate for situations in which the
timing of water availability alone is affected.
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sumption." '2 Although the analogy is of questionable validity for
quantitative estimations of growth,3 it provides a useful context
for examining water transfer. A market context is suggested
wherein transfer is analogous to a sales transaction. Parties to the
transfer may be individuals or agencies, and the process may occur
at different market "levels." Transfer between entities at the same
marketing level may be termed "horizontal" as distinct from ver-
tical transactions which typically might involve transfers of water
from a district to its individual members or from a federal or state
agency to a local district.
The concept of "market level" suggests different stages within
the chain of agencies and organizations which stretch from those
engaged in water development at one extreme to actual water use
at the other. Each component in this spectrum theoretically adds
to the value of water, and its activities represent investments
either in the form of capital structures or the services of manage-
ment, regulation, and maintenance. As water passes from the juris-
diction of one organization to the next, fees or other charges
usually are made to finance the investment program represented
at each particular level.
Primary emphasis is placed on vertical transfer procedures, al-
though horizontal water transfers also have important implications
for economic growth.
Economic growth may be viewed as a comparison of the real
product emanating from an area at two separate points in time,
or a rate of growth continuously changing over time. The inter-
pretation one adopts is strategic for its relationship to water
transfer.
From a comparative static standpoint, the transfer process may
be considered as a mechanism through which production activities
involving water are initiated. The economic function of transfer is
primarily one of allocation, and customary efficiency criteria are
conceptually valid. The bulk of recent literature on economic growth
has been concerned with precisely this interpretation.
The other viewpoint considers economic growth and water trans-
fer within a social environment characterized by continual change.
2. I. M. Lee, Optimum Water Resource Development: A Preliminary Statement of
Methodology for Quantitative Analysis (Giannini Foundation Report No. 206, Univ. of
Cal. 1958).
3. Aside from the difficulties inherent in a water production function, there is often
no clear separation between water production and consumption in terms either of
processes or decision agents.
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The economic functions of water transfer now include more than
merely allocating water; they include maintaining a given rate of
investment by agencies within the marketing spectrum. Whereas
the comparative static view of economic growth may lead one to
consider water transfer as a means of allocating a given stock of
water, a more dynamic interpretation requires water transfer to
maintain and enhance the functioning of a large array of water
organizations, each of which engages in its particular type of in-
vestment program and all of which affect the economy's output.
The criteria which are relevant for evaluating various water trans-
fer procedures in this broader sense cannot be defined on an a priori
basis. Their specification requires understanding the functions of
the entire set of activities and relationships discussed above.
II
IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
What functional relationship may be posited between water trans-
fer and economic growth as defined? Insofar as water transfer
facilitates water use, it enables a significant resource to enter the
economy, the full consequence of which depends upon the eventual
form of use. If used to initiate new production, the net value of
the goods produced is added to the system's economic output. If
used to alter or "displace" previous production as, for example,
the introduction of irrigation in an existing dry-farm area, the ex-
cess net value of irrigated crops over the displaced dry-farmed
output represents the increment to the economy's output. A third
type of use might involve the provision of supplemental water to
an area possessing local supplies of water which are declining in
quantity or quality. The consequence of such a transfer might be
the perpetuation of production which otherwise would have been
impossible because of water deficiencies. Again, additional goods
or services would be added to the region's economic output.
A. Water Mobility and Economic Growth
Perfecting systems of water transfer makes water a more mobile
factor of production. The relationship between the degree of factor
mobility and both the rate and composition of economic growth
claims a substantial literature. For purposes of the present discus-
sion, two arguments from this literature are relevant. The first
argument claims that the greater the mobility of a given productive
factor, the greater will be its eventual contribution to the economic
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product of the system at large.4 This assumes that uses in which
water has high productivity will "outbid" less efficient ones for the
limited mobile factor. The second argument stands in opposition
to this, arguing an inverse relationship between mobility and eco-
nomic output.'
This apparent dichotomy stems from different spatial interpreta-
tions of an "economy" rather than a contradiction in logic. The first
argument considers an entire, self-contained economic system; the
second considers a regional component of such a system. Considera-
tion of the former imposes fewer constraints on factor inputs which,
in turn, affords greater flexibility and adaptability to production
processes using mobile resources. Viewing growth from a sectional
standpoint, imperfectly mobile, yet sufficiently scarce, resources
constitute a stimulus for the regional importation of other factors.
This may affect both the composition and magnitude of regional
output. The attraction of the mobile "other factor"-or mobile
water uses-will tend to increase regional product by the amount
of rent or quasi rent imputed to the relatively immobile water
factor.
It should be emphasized that transfer refers to the exchange-
ability of water, not merely its physical transplacement. Perfections
in tenure arrangements or the fractioning of fee simple ownership
may enhance exchangeability without affecting inherent difficulties
in its physical transplacement. A resource's economic mobility may
be enhanced by perfecting either institutional or physical aspects
of transfer.
B. Some Quantitative Problems
Quantification of economic growth resulting from water transfer
poses numerous difficulties. A particular problem is encountered in
the transfer between public and private agencies, 6 namely, the prob-
lem of determining value for public goods.
4. This proposition is implicit in the classical notion of general equilibrium. It
permits a resource to "migrate" to that use in which it has the highest marginal value
product. If immobility thwarts this, the size of the system's economic product is reduced.
See K. E. Boulding, Economic Analysis (Harper & Bros. 1941) ; A. W. Stonier & D. C.
Hague, Textbook of Economic Theory 123-47 (Longmans, Green & Co. 1957).
5. J. H. Dales, Comment on T. W. Schultz, Connections Between Natural Resources
and Economic Gro'wth, in Natural Resources and Economic Growth 16 (Spengler ed.,
Resources for the Future, Inc. 1961).
6. Similar problems may exist even though the transfer initially is between public
agencies, so long as subsequent transfer is made involving a private individual or orga-
nization.
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According to the traditional concept of the circular flow of an
economy, an identity exists between the wages paid factors of pro-
duction and total economic product.7 This identity is preserved in
actuality only if all residual rents are calculated as factor costs. 8
Factor costs represent resource values in alternative uses, and,
hence, residual rents above this cost cannot be independently es-
timated.9 One needs to compute the excess of product value over
factor costs, calling this a residual rent aggregate for purposes of
the formulation suggested above.
If resources such as water, being transferred between public and
private agencies, are introduced into the circular flow, how should
their value be computed? If water is freely given to users, its cost
being paid from general tax receipts,10 the cost of "other factors"
has increased due to their utilization in water development. But
how has the value of the total product changed? To be sure, the
free water which is made available will induce factor recombination
and consequent changes in output, distribution, and thus the real
value of the economy's output. But how is this to be computed?
The United States Department of Commerce has argued that
public goods should be accounted for by including their factor cost
values in the measurement of economic output. These are the cost
of factors used to produce the public good or service. The Depart-
ment considers public goods and services, which are priced in the
market, as final consumer goods; for computational purposes, they
are not distinguished from privately produced and marketed goods.
Two different phenomena are measured, depending on whether
water is "priced" or freely distributed. In the first instance, the
marginal value of the last unit of water to consumers is being
measured if the pricing is competitive;"1 in the second, factor cost
of water production measures the value of resources employed in
7. These "wages" include interest payments, profits, and offsets for depreciation of
capital assets.
8. R. T. Bowman & R. A. Easterlin, The Income Side: Some Theoretical Aspects, in
A Critique of the United States Income and Product Accounts 149 (National Bureau of
Economic Research, Princeton Univ. Press 1958).
9. For a provocative discussion of this and related points, see Forte & Buchanan,
The Evaluation of Public Service, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 107 (1961).
10. For our purposes, it may be assumed that the factor costs are paid from neutral
income tax receipts, which have no effect on existing price relationships in the economy.
11. The term "pricing" is used here in the narrow sense, implying a bidding situation
that reflects the intersection of supply and demand functions. It further implies a volume-
based price that is directly incident on the water user.
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water development in their highest alternative uses. The numerical
results also will differ. Thus, according to present United States
Department of Commerce practice, public goods not sold on a
reasonably open market will tend to be undervalued in terms of the
statistical computation of national output.
Going deeper into the problem, we may consider two situations-
one in which a vertical transfer of water is made without charge
to the transferee and one in which the same quantity of water is
sold on a reasonably open market. The free-water situation will be
characterized by a lower general price level because water is being
priced at zero; this will result in prices for final goods that do not
include a return to water. The second situation will result in a
larger economic output because water's market price will be re-
flected in a higher price of final goods. However, the apparently
smaller income generated in the first situation could buy all the
goods in the second situation at its own price level.12 The test of
invariance holds in this instance, and both situations represent iden-
tical rates of real economic growth.
If we assume, as seems plausibile, that less water is used in the
second situation than the first because of its price to users, fewer
resources would be devoted to the production of water and more
to the production of other items of output than would be the case
in the first situation. The composition of output in the two com-
munities differs. Judgments regarding appropriate weights have
to be made for an index number comparison to be achieved, and
the welfare consequence is statistically indeterminate.
C. Implications for Efficiency and Equity
A transfer process which allocates a limited resource to the high-
est competing use may be considered efficient' 3 and will be reflected
in a rapid rate of growth for a short period. The efficiency of
economic growth, however, also is affected by the duration of the
high rate. A very rapid rate of short-term growth may be less
desirable than a somewhat lower rate of growth over a longer time
interval. The problem of appropriate comparisons has remained
a perpetual issue in social economics. Suffice it to say that a compari-
12. See Forte and Buchanan, op. cit. supra note 10.
13. Economic efficiency implies receiving the largest value of output from a given
value of inputs within environmental conditions usually held stable through ceteris
paribus assumptions.
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son of present values of growth paths over time seems an analytic-
ally valid approach. The proper definition of an appropriate rate of
discount in aggregating such growth paths over time remains an
issue of debate.' 4
On more fundamental theoretical grounds, economic efficiency
may be assessed in terms of the extent to which relevant costs and
returns are brought into conjunction for purposes of decision mak-
ing. The efficiency of atomistic competition implies that the decision
maker, whether he be consumer or purchaser, shoulders all costs
and receives all returns. Indeed, rational economic choice may be
called efficient only if these conditions prevail. Inherent externalities
in water use often result in violation of this principle. Frequently,
costs associated with water transfer are paid by society in general
or by the community in the vicinity of the place of transfer.
The other relatively familiar aspect of economic efficiency with
which we shall deal relates to the tenure side of water transfer. En-
titlement to use water, whether a water right or service contract,
is a real asset, and the security of that entitlement may be assumed
a basic determinant of time preference with which the use of water
and related investment decisions are regarded. This becomes es-
pecially important for irrigated agriculture and other potential uses
in which relatively heavy investment in associated inputs is re-
quired.' 5 Economic growth characterizing a given system would
tend to be less self-sustaining with high tenure uncertainty than with
a low level of such uncertainties.
The implications of water transfer also pose problems in terms
of equity. These include the effect of particular types of water
transfer on income distribution either directly or indirectly through
the composition of changes in real output. A change in equity posi-
tion of an economy involves changes in real relative wealth or net
asset value of sub-groups or individuals within the economy.' The
philosophical difficulties of defining an optimal state of equity or
14. See 0. Eckstein, A Survey of the Theory of Public Expenditure Criteria, in Public
Finances: Needs, Sources, and Utilization 453 (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Princeton Univ. Press 1961).
15. In general, the lower the tenure security in a particular water transfer process,
the higher will be the time preference rate used in the decisions with respect to such
associated investment.
16. A crucial, yet surprisingly unexplored, problem of definition is involved in
distinguishing an economy from its subgroups. The relevant attribute seems to be the
institutional cohesion of a system occupying both space and identifiable activities (lines
of production). Frequently, economic analysis adopts political and jurisdictional systems
-largely, I suspect, because data prospects favor such demarcations-without critical
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inequity will not be detailed here. Rather, "equitable" economic
growth will be considered as a positive rate of change of the real
output of an economy with a smaller aggregate variation from the
mean on a per capita basis.
A per capita definition of equitable growth, however, may not be
sufficient. Regional income differences may be increased even though
per capita equity criteria are not violated, with substantial implica-
tions for long-run growth. Regional economic domination may per-
mit systematic introduction of market distortions which, while ap-
pearing to yield "efficient" results at the firm level, may in fact be
singularly inefficient from an overall aggregate standpoint.' 7 This
is a form of organizational oligopoly which may exist in either the
final product or factor markets.
A corollary to this point, and one which links the equity question
with the statistical problems dealt with above, relates to the manner
in which public water is valued. If it is valued at market prices
(and this assumes the method of water transfer involves user prices
determined on some sort of a market), we should strive for per-
fection on the product market. If, on the other hand, water is
valued at factor cost (as the United States Department of Com-
merce would have us do), the interests of equity require perfection
of the factor markets to prevent the accrual of substantial quasi
rents on those markets.
III
AN ASSESSMENT OF TRANSFER FORMS
A. Tenure Forms
At least three types of ownership equities are pertinent to actual
water transfer procedures: (1) outright ownership of a water
right, (2) long-term water service delivery contracts, and (3) simi-
lar contracts of a short-term nature. The first and third represent
extremes, with most vertical transfers of water taking the form
of relatively long-run water service contracts. Long-run commit-
attention to whether or not existing institutions logically warrant such definition. Inter-
state contracts and international treaties frequently have redefined previously logical
concepts of a "relevant economy" and its subgroups.
17. Southern California may be considered an example of regional dominance. The
regional pricing arrangements associated with California's water development program
will tend to displace production that otherwise would occur in the northern parts of the
state. This southern migration of production is of questionable efficiency from the stand-
point of the economy of the state of California. See M. F. Brewer, Economics of Public
Water Pricing 19-23 (Giannini Foundation Report No. 244, Univ. of Cal. 1961).
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ments of water service-continual service at the extreme-as op-
posed to short-run or temporary water service will be considered.
It is difficult to generalize about the impact of contract life on
the rapidity of economic growth. One point of leverage on the rate
and duration of economic growth is the effect of contract length
on time preference rates. For annual commitments of a given quan-
tity of water, the value of a service contract will be directly related
to its legal life. Long-term contracts may be expected to have in-
dividual time preference rates relatively lower than those associated
with shorter contracts, permitting greater futurity in planning.
As a consequence, investment programs or production plans with
relatively long periods of amortization in associated lines of in-
vestment would be economically feasible. Although this does not
assure a larger growth per se, any production alternative feasible
for short-term leases is likewise possible under a long-term lease.
Viewed at a more aggregate level, however, long-term leases may
tend to freeze production patterns. This facilitates economic
growth only so long as the initial contracting use represents the
economically "highest use," or if no market for subcontracting
exists. The latter condition may stem from outright prohibition on
subcontracting or from high fixed costs associated with water use
such as those characteristic of irrigated agriculture. This becomes
especially pertinent if payment forms other than unit user fees are
employed, for they generally increase fixed production costs.
Granting that long-term leases often pose difficulties for sub-
leasing or exchange, the economic advantage of relative security
and associated lower time preference must be weighed against
stickiness in reallocation as other alternative water uses develop
over time or as the relative productivities of existing alternatives
change. Some resolution between the conflicting economic prop-
erties of longer time horizons and allocation rigidity is needed.18
Obviously, each particular case would have to be evaluated on its
own merits, but one plausibly might advocate long-term contracts
18. This problem was considered recently by Gaffney with respect to California
water rights. His primary emphasis is on allocative rigidity, but a sequel study is needed
that analyzes the implications for economic growth of the relatively long planning and
investment horizon these rights have occasioned. See M. Gaffney, Diseconomies Inherent
in Western Water Laws: A California Case Study, in Water and Range Resources and
Economic Development of the West: Economic Analysis of Multiple Use, the Arizona
Watershed Program-A Case Study of Multiple Use 55 (Proceedings of the Committee
on the Economics of Water Resources Development, Western Agricultural Economics
Research Council 1961).
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when the structure of the regional economy is relatively stable and
high associated investments are required in connection with water
use.
Within the general terms of existing contractual institutions,
long-term security and flexibility-from the standpoint of water
transferability-have been competitive, largely because of inherent
physical problems of scheduling deliveries via distribution systems
with limited capacity.' 9 This competitiveness could be reduced by
some device permitting a tenure security commensurate with the
time preference associated with the type of use to which water is
put-relatively low if it enables a regional conversion to an irri-
gated economy, somewhat higher if used in a production enterprise
not requiring associated investment of long gestation, etc.
Basically, transfer indivisibilities in ownership of two sorts need
to be overcome: indivisibilities in quantity and over time. Reduction
of quantitative indivisibilities favors development of a competi-
tive market environment wherein such transfer may occur. Reduc-
ing temporal indivisibilities increases the frequency of opportunities
for water reallocation. Although in itself not sufficient, the ability
to redefine proprietary interest is a necessary condition to such a
reallocation.
A reduction of these two types of indivisibilities at the wholesale
level may be considered as an increase in the negotiability of water
delivery contracts and bears directly upon the problem of water
transfer in connection with secular economic adjustments of agri-
culture.2 o
Increased negotiability would facilitate adjustment among water-
using activities on the one hand and water supply organization on
the other. Proprietary interest could be shifted as different forms
of local distributive organizations appear more appropriate. Differ-
ent forms of local distribution organizations may be desired as a
result of such change, or they may be adopted specifically to induce
19. To some extent, this relationship may be mitigated by changing the design of the
water delivery system. For example, the trend in California toward demand delivery by
irrigation districts permits greater flexibility. Adoption of a continuous delivery method
would achieve similar increases in flexibility, but generally this method is impracticable in
semiarid areas because of limited water supplies.
20. Obviously, concurrence by both contracting entities would be required to permit
the transition to be incorporated into the delivery schedule of the former and avoid over-
capacity demands on the aqueduct system. Similarly, a legal transfer of liability for pay-
ments during the remaining life of the contract would require agreement of all parties.
Under these provisions, however, negotiable contracts would contribute to the economic
efficiency of the operation of a regional program of water development and distribution.
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these changes that are deemed desirable. Reduction of these indivis-
ibilities would correspondingly reduce lags in these shifts, permit-
ting a more rapid realization of the implied increments in real
income.
There would be no a priori tendency for the negotiable contract
to induce equity problems. Indeed, linked with provisions for a
centrally imposed assessment upon a new contract recipient, the
cost to new recipients could be varied purposively to capture a
portion of the consumers' surplus such transfer might entail.
B. Payment Forms
Water transfer usually entails a wide variety of payment forms.
Entirely free service user fees and regionally imposed ad valorem
assessments have been used. Here again, the analysis is simplified
by focusing on extremes.
The two polar forms of payment in water transfer are user fees,
based upon either average or marginal cost, and free water, in the
sense that the economy as a whole repays the project from general
tax revenues. Projects that are supported regionally by taxes and/or
various other types of fees represent intermediate positions.
The price aspect of water transfer performs two economic func-
tions: allocation and repayment. The extent to which it adequately
allocates water can be assessed theoretically by traditional margin-
ality tests. The repayment function is adequately performed if
least-cost production is facilitated and a "correct" supply response
elicited. Marginal cost pricing satisfies both criteria so long as no
externalities exist in production or consumption. If there are ex-
ternalities-manifest in consumers' surplus or quasi rents-mar-
ginal cost pricing will not suffice. It has been argued that under
such circumstances marginal cost pricing, coupled with a tax-
financed subsidy, is the most desirable way out on the assumption
that higher cost firms will be eliminated through competition in the
product market. However, the lack of traditional competition in
the water market weakens this argument as a guide for price policy
with respect to water transfer.
With respect to the rapidity of economic growth, "free water"
will have many bidders and, hence, will speed up the physical pro-
cesses of conversion from dry to irrigated farming. Expenditures on
complementary inputs will proceed at a relatively rapid rate, stim-
ulating regional economic growth. On the other hand, the provision
of free water presumably will reduce the price level of irrigation
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products to the consumer and thus lower the general price level of
the region. As developed above, if a different quantity were con-
sumed under "free water" conditions than with a user price, the
resulting impact on a regional output formally is indeterminate.
It may be noted that the tax-financing route commonly has been
followed when water transfer has involved irrigating previously
unirrigated agricultural land. A similar trend has been observed in
initial water transfers to municipalities or urban agencies. In the
latter case, this is reflected in general obligation bond financing.
Subsequent tranfers, however, often have shifted the payment
form toward user fees. Relatively larger water tolls were the
vehicle of this shift within public irrigation districts and revenue
bonds or similar financing arrangements for municipalities and ur-
ban groups. The efficiency of such a transition has been discussed
in light of the accrual of secondary benefits during the initial pe-
riods of transfer and the relatively more important role of specific
primary benefits during subsequent periods.21
IV
CHANGE OF WATER TRANSFER INSTITUTIONS:
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR A POLITICAL ECONOMY
There are broader implications of water transfer processes than
the technical aspects discussed above-implications of a less formal
but hardly less significant nature. Water transfer institutions have
changed as western irrigated agricultural economies have under-
gone different stages of development. These trends may be dis-
cerned in the historical performance of transfer agencies as well
as through cross-sectional observation. In this final section, atten-
tion is focused on the transfer institutions used at several stages
of development.
Five stages of regional water development are considered. In
California these have followed in general chronological order, al-
though the sequence may not have been precisely duplicated else-
where.
1. Initial irrigation with local water supplies.
2. The development and use of more distant regional sources
of water.
21. See M. F. Brewer, Water Pricing and Allocation with Particular Reference to
California Irrigation Districts 126-32 (Giannini Foundation Report No. 235, Univ. of
Cal. 1960).
JANUARY, 19651
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
3. The integrated management and use of ground and surface
water.
4. Coordinating the jurisdiction of water supply agencies (both
federal and state government agencies).
5. Providing for increasing water demand of urban water
services.
Each of these five stages has placed emphasis on different prob-
lems with implications for water transfer. During the development
of indigenous supplies, which occurred in California during the
latter third of the last century, clarification of water tenure was
stressed. This emphasis is reflected by the perfection of the ap-
propriative right to surface water in California and by the frac-
tioning of water ownership through joint stock water companies.
A problem associated with this era of private water development
was the physical necessity of coordinating local water distribution
facilities. This need stimulated the institutionalization of a regula-
tory agency, usually in the form of a watermaster. Acknowledg-
ment of the need for such regulatory powers was one of the rallying
points of irrigation district enthusiasts during the 1880's.
During the second stage of development, problems of tenure
perfection and physical coordination persisted, but the large in-
vestments needed to divert and transfer distant water emphasized
the financial side of water transfer. Public districts were seen as
the institutions which afforded appropriate financial flexibility. They
could bond-finance these investments and had the power of ad
valorem assessment. Assessment on unimproved property within
the district not only provided a dependable source of revenue for
bond servicing but also enabled the irrigator to retain a net farm
return sufficiently large to undertake the relatively high investments
in associated inputs required for irrigated cultivation. The transition
from dry farming to irrigation occurred relatively rapidly within
irrigation districts in California.
The stage of development that focused on ground surface water
management again placed emphasis on the payment side of water
transfer. Direct integrated management by the district was ham-
pered by the appropriative and correlative water rights doctrines. 2
22. The correlative doctrine establishes coequal rights to use groundwater for overly-
ing landowners. A groundwater appropriative right is perfected by withdrawing and
using groundwater on nonoverlying property. In neither of these instances could the
district per se exercise its police power to control groundwater use.
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Management plans were implemented by devising transfer pay-
ments so that economic incentive induced the combinations of use
embodied by the management plan. Various types of water toll
were developed, and the creation of internal improvement dis-
tricts within parent irrigation districts enabled differential rates
of assessment. In addition to these more flexible systems of trans-
fer payment, intermember transfers of water were facilitated. Pro-
rating procedures were developed for times of inadequate surface
supply, and a general strengthening of the transfer authority's
police power occurred. It is interesting to note that the concept of
"efficient water use" was broadened during this stage of develop-
ment to embrace the total water supply available to a district,
including indigenous ground and surface water sources as well as
imported supplies. To accomplish this, greater regulatory authority
was required than when the concept of efficient resource use was
limited to district imported surface water alone.
The fourth stage of development-and basically this is where
California presently finds itself-faces squarely the problem of co-
ordination among various water supply agencies. This includes
coordination between federal, state, and local agencies and con-
cerns all three aspects of water transfer (the physical, tenure, and
financial aspects). Coordination is being achieved primarily through
water transfer contract. This represents a somewhat unique ap-
proach to this problem, for, generally, problems of agency supply
coordination have been sought through interagency treaties, com-
pacts, and agreements. With the politically powerful and well-or-
ganized water user groups which exist in California, interagency co-
ordination frequently is attempted through a bargaining process, in
which the terms of contract are made as attractive as possible by each
of the competing supply agencies. The actual form of coordination
is determined by the water-consuming groups. Illustrating such co-
ordination is the integration of United States Bureau of Reclamation
water from the Central Valley Project and the supplies developed
by public water districts. Each district has selected the combination
of sources felt most appropriate to its particular needs.
California is now facing a similar issue as the state, the United
States Bureau of Reclamation, and numerous local water supply
organizations attempt coordination. Both the United States Bureau
of Reclamation and the state are offering water supplies to irri-
gated agriculture in the San Joaquin Valley. This competition has
been documented by continual changes in the forms of water trans-
JANUARY, 1965"]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
fer contract offered this area. Although negotiation of the water
delivery contract between the state and the Metropolitan Water
District has standardized the basic contract form, the payment
formulations included appear to be at least partially a negotiable
variable.
The fifth stage of development is not a necessary sequent to the
four which have been discussed. It is, however, a typical problem
recurring with increased frequency through the arid West and one
that has stimulated development of new institutions which have
provided the legal and administrative vehicles for water transfer.
They are primarily organizational in nature and center on the con-
cept of municipal area service which coordinates water supply
with numerous other services such as waste disposal, fire protection,
and health services.
The significance of this series of mutations in water transfer
institutions is substantial. It has permitted more efficient resource
allocation as new problems have become apparent and thus has had
a salutary effect on the development potential of the regional
economy. Although it does not assure a higher rate of economic
growth from one point in time to the next, it admits the possibilities
for such increases, and, more important still, it increases the prob-
ability that economic growth will be self-adjusting and thus self-
sustaining over longer periods of time.
The empirical consequences of this tradition in the field of water
resources development seem strongly to endorse a broad intellectual
point of departure for economic research. The mechanistic concept
of society, involving a fundamentally static conceptualization of an
"objective function," may be questioned in light of this experience.
Possibly more relevant criteria for evaluating water transfer de-
vices would be facilitated if the broad disciplinary partnerships
suggested by these problems occur in the research process.
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